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 1 
Lecture 
THE CONSCIENCE OF A PROSECUTOR 
David Luban 
Dedicated to the memory of Fred Zacharias 
 
In this lecture, I want to ask some very large and fundamental 
questions about the role of conscience and a lawyer‘s own moral 
convictions, and what to do if they conflict with the lawyer‘s 
professional obligations.  I also want to ask what those professional 
obligations are for prosecutors in an adversary system of criminal justice.  
Finally, I shall raise questions about whether a lawyer working in an 
organization ought to defer her judgment to higher-ups in the 
organization. 
But I am going to focus these large inquiries through a very concrete 
question:  should a prosecutor throw a case to avoid keeping men he 
thinks are innocent in prison? 
Two years ago, a startling story appeared in the New York Times:  a 
veteran prosecutor in New York City‘s District Attorney‘s (―D.A.‘s‖) 
office, Daniel Bibb, was assigned to reexamine two men‘s murder 
convictions because of new evidence.1  The men had been in prison for 
more than a decade, and the new evidence showed that they might be 
victims of a horrible case of mistaken identity, as defense lawyers and a 
tenacious police detective had maintained for years.  After an exhaustive 
twenty-one-month investigation, Bibb became convinced they were not 
                                                 
 University Professor and Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University 
Law Center.  This article is an expanded version of the Tabor Lecture that I delivered at 
Valparaiso School of Law in April 2010.  My title is modeled after David Mellinkoff‘s 1973 
classic The Conscience of a Lawyer, which I gratefully acknowledge.  I am also grateful to Dan 
Bibb for extensive discussion of the case described here, as well as comments and 
corrections he offered to an earlier draft.  After I had posted an earlier version of this article 
on SSRN and Berkeley Electronic Press, one of the defense lawyers, Steve Cohen, contacted 
me and gave me his perspective on the case, which I have incorporated into the present 
version.  I am very grateful to him for taking the time to write and talk with me.  Thanks as 
well to Professors Bob Condlin, Bruce Green, Deborah Rhode, Brad Wendel, and Melanie 
Wilson for comments on the earlier version.  In the summer of 2010, I presented a version 
of this paper to the Aksaray (Turkey) Bar Association as part of a legal ethics conference 
organized by the bar associations of Ankara and Aksaray as well as the University of 
Ankara.  I wish to thank Professors Ioanna Kuçuradi and Gülriz Uygur for discussions of 
the case, as well as Professor Tomo Morigiwa for his helpful comments. 
1 Benjamin Weiser, Doubting Case, a Prosecutor Helped the Defense, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/nyregion/23da.html?_r=1&pagewanted=al 
[hereinafter Weiser, Doubting Case]. 
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guilty.  But he could not persuade his superiors to drop the cases, so he 
went in to the hearing and, in his words, he threw the case. ―I did the 
best I could,‖ Bibb said, ―To lose.‖2 
As he explained to the reporter, Bibb helped defense lawyers connect 
the different pieces of evidence.  He persuaded exculpatory witnesses to 
testify, told them in advance what his cross-examination questions 
would be, and held his fire in cross.  All the while, he continued to ask 
his superiors to drop the cases.  They agreed to do so for one man, and 
the judge ordered a new trial for the other.3  At that point, Bibb said, 
―I‘m done . . . . I wanted nothing to do with it.‖4  Bibb eventually 
resigned—although he had been happy with his career as a prosecutor. 
After this startling story appeared in the Times, New York 
disciplinary authorities filed a complaint against Bibb; eventually he was 
cleared of disciplinary charges.5  Currently, Bibb is in private practice. 
As for the two men that Bibb thought were wrongly convicted:  
Olmedo Hidalgo, against whom the D.A.‘s office dropped the charges, 
was deported to the Dominican Republic.6  David Lemus, who the D.A.‘s 
office re-tried over Bibb‘s objection, was acquitted by a jury and released 
after spending fourteen years in prison.7  Subsequently, he sued New 
York City for wrongful imprisonment, and the city settled for $1.2 
million.8  Hidalgo also sued, and reportedly settled for more than twice 
that amount.9  Their lawsuits were based on powerful proof that the 
police detective investigating the crime had from the very beginning 
ignored evidence that another man, Thomas ―Spanky‖ Morales, was the 
real shooter.  When new evidence of mistaken identity surfaced later, the 
D.A.‘s office compounded the error by dragging its feet and defending 
                                                 
2 Id. 
3 People v. Lemus & Hidalgo, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3611, at *1 n.1, *83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
County Oct. 25, 2005). 
4 Weiser, Doubting Case, supra note 1. 
5 Benjamin Weiser, Lawyer Who Threw a City Case Is Vindicated, Not Punished, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 5, 2009, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/nyregion/ 
05da.html [hereinafter Weiser, Threw a City Case]. 
6 Anemona Hartocollis, Witness Confesses in 1990 Killing, but Prosecutors Keep Pursuing 
Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/03/nyregion/ 
03palladium.html?pagewanted=print [hereinafter Hartocollis, Witness Confesses]. 
7 Anemona Hartocollis, Man Convicted in Club Death Is Acquitted at Second Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/nyregion/07palladium.html 
[hereinafter Hartocollis, Man Convicted]. 
8 Man Awarded $1.2 Million After Spending 14 Years Behind Bars for Wrongful Conviction, 
BOSSIP, Dec. 30, 2009, http://bossip.com/197716/man-awarded-1-2-million-after-
spending-14-years-behind-bars-for-wrongful-conviction/. 
9 Benjamin Weiser, Settlement for Man Wrongly Convicted in Palladium Killing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 31, 2009, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/nyregion/ 
31palladium.html [hereinafter Weiser, Settlement]. 
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the convictions.10  From the defense point of view, Bibb‘s assignment to 
reinvestigate the case came far too late, and his moral dilemma arose 
because he was instructed to defend convictions in the face of 
overwhelming evidence of innocence that defense lawyers had 
developed over many years.  In the opinion of defense lawyer Steven 
Cohen, ―Frankly, there was no[t] a prosecutor in the DA‘s Office who 
could have preserved those convictions.‖11  Cohen rejects the view that 
Bibb threw the case, because ―by the time we got to a hearing the result 
was all but pre-ordained.‖12 
Bibb disputes Cohen‘s view that his investigation was unnecessary; 
he points to several key witnesses whose evidence he developed.13  In 
any case, even if the result of the hearing was a foregone conclusion, that 
would not make Bibb‘s dilemma less real.  He was still ordered to defend 
convictions of men that he was sure were innocent; in that situation, no 
one can afford to think that their own actions are irrelevant.  But that is 
getting ahead of the story. 
I.  THE PALLADIUM MURDER 
Before turning to issues of ethics and theory, it will be useful to 
understand the facts of the case.  It began in 1990 at an East Village 
nightclub called the Palladium on Thanksgiving night.  A bouncer 
punched a man in the face and expelled him from the club.  The man 
decided to take revenge and returned with friends and guns.  In the wee 
hours of the morning, two of the gunmen opened fire on bouncers 
standing outside the club, killing 23-year-old Mark Petersen and 
wounding a second bouncer.14 
How did police come to arrest Lemus and Hidalgo for the Palladium 
murder?  The two men claimed they did not even know each other; 
Hidalgo said he had never been to the Palladium, and Lemus said he 
                                                 
10 See People v. Morales, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2812, at *12–15 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 
Sept. 22, 2006) (laying out the history of the investigative and prosecutorial efforts).  Judge 
Bonnie Wittner‘s opinion certainly was that the investigative and prosecutorial efforts were 
botched.  Id. 
11 E-mail from Steven M. Cohen to author (June 2, 2010, 07:49 PM) (on file with author). 
12 Id. 
13 See E-mail from Daniel Bibb to author (Aug. 11, 2010, 05:18 PM) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Bibb E-mail, 5:18] (mentioning witnesses Eddie Troche, Mike Colomer, Darrell 
Gray, and Danila ―Sanchez‖ Troche); E-mail from Daniel Bibb to author (Aug. 11, 2010, 
01:57 PM) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bibb E-mail, 1:57] (mentioning Troche, 
Colomer, and Gray). 
14 Stone Phillips & Dan Slepian, Murder at the Palladium:  Were Two Men Wrongly 
Convicted in New York Nightclub Case?, DATELINE NBC (Sept. 8, 2008, 9:06:58 PM ET), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6913736/ns/dateline_nbc-crime_reports//. 
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had been there only once in his life, a year before the shooting.  But both 
had prior arrests that got their photos into police files and led to 
eyewitnesses picking them out of photo arrays that detectives showed 
them.  At trial, multiple eyewitnesses were able to identify Lemus and 
Hidalgo.15 
There was one other damning piece of evidence against Lemus:  he 
bragged to a woman named Delores Spencer that he had committed the 
Palladium killing.  She told a friend who told the police.  Police had 
Spencer tape subsequent phone calls with Lemus.16  This is what the jury 
at the 1992 trial heard on the tape: 
David Lemus:  ―If you‘re scared, just say you‘re scared.‖ 
Delores Spencer:  ―Why should I be scared of you?‖ 
Lemus:  ―Because you know that I know that you 
know.‖  [3 short puffs]17 
Lemus and Hidalgo‘s attorney did not put on any witnesses, and after a 
day‘s deliberation, the jury convicted the men of second-degree murder.  
They each drew sentences of 25 years to life.18 
That might have been the end of the story except for a series of 
coincidences.  Around the time the jury convicted Lemus and Hidalgo, 
New York City detective Robert Addolorato was investigating a Bronx 
drug and extortion gang called C&C.19  One of his informants told him 
that two C&C members named Joey Pillot and Thomas ―Spanky‖ 
Morales—not Lemus or Hidalgo—were the real Palladium shooters.20 
Addolorato reported what he heard to the Manhattan D.A.‘s office 
but was told that it did not match the known facts.21  Understanding 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 People v. Morales, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2812, at *8–10 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Sept. 
22, 2006). 
20 Id. 
21 Herein lies a story.  At the time of the murder, an anonymous caller told Manhattan 
police that ―Joey‖ and ―Spanky‖ were the shooters.  Jane Fritsch & David Rohde, In the Face 
of Evidence—A Special Report; Another Confessed in Killing, But 2 Men Remain in Prison, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 25, 2000, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/25/nyregion/ 
face-evidence-special-report-another-confessed-killing-but-2-men-remain-prison.html.  
Victoria Garcia, the investigating detective matched the nickname ―Spanky‖ to a man 
named Franky Figueroa, but excluded him as a suspect when she discovered that he was 
incarcerated the night of the shooting.  Morales, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2812 at *3–4.  Lemus 
seemed like a far more obvious suspect, because of his boast to Delores Spencer that he had 
done the shooting.  Detective Garcia followed up on Lemus, and ―Spanky‖ dropped 
through the cracks. 
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quite well that snitches sometimes lie, Detective Addolorato let it drop 
until 1996, four years later.  By that time he was working with federal 
prosecutors in the C&C investigation, and they arrested none other than 
Joey Pillot and Spanky Morales.  Pillot agreed to cooperate, and his 
lawyer worked out what prosecutors call a ―queen for a day‖ agreement:  
Pillot would sing, and none of what he said could be used to prosecute 
him.22 
Pillot told the investigators that he and Morales were indeed the real 
Palladium shooters.  Furthermore, he provided details that matched the 
facts:  he remembered that his own gun had jammed and that he ejected 
a cartridge—and police in fact found an ejected cartridge on the scene.23  
Additionally, Morales drove a blue Oldsmobile, with a license number 
containing an 8 and a 1.  Eyewitnesses had told police that the shooters 
escaped in a blue car whose license number included an 8 and a 1.24 
Addolorato went back to the D.A.‘s office, and, after some initial 
resistance, the D.A. agreed to a new hearing on the Palladium shooting:  
a so-called ―440 hearing,‖ referring to section 440.10(g) of the New York 
Code, which provides for motions to vacate a judgment when new 
evidence is discovered.  But the D.A. argued that the new information, 
which might well incriminate Spanky Morales, did not show that Lemus 
or Hidalgo were innocent—and the judge agreed.25  Even back at the 
original trial, prosecutors had raised the possibility of a third 
perpetrator.26  Justice Gold found Pillot‘s claim that he and Morales were 
the sole perpetrators ―entirely unworthy of belief.‖27 
Then, in 2000, an inmate named Richie Feliciano read a news story 
about the Palladium case.28  In early 2001, he told federal prosecutors 
that he had been at the Palladium that night, just a few feet away when 
Spanky Morales shot the bouncers.  Feliciano had been the ―mediator‖ 
attempting to defuse the conflict between Morales and the bouncers—or 
perhaps the decoy distracting the bouncers.29  In fact, Feliciano said he 
was the one who drove Morales‘s car away from the scene.  It seemed 
                                                 
22 Hartocollis, Witness Confesses, supra note 6. 
23 Id. 
24 Morales, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2812 at *9. 
25 Id. at *10–12. 
26 Hartocollis, Witness Confesses, supra note 6, Dec. 7, 2007 correction. 
27 People v. Lemus & Hidalgo, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3611, at *20 (Oct. 25, 2005). 
28 Interview with Steven Cohen (July 24, 2010).  Cohen indicated that Feliciano read the 
New York Times article by Fritsch and Rohde cited supra at note 21.  Id. 
29 Cohen Interview, supra note 28.  The description of Feliciano as a mediator is Cohen‘s.  
Bibb believes that Feliciano‘s role in the Palladium shooting was to distract the bouncers.  
E-mail from Daniel Bibb to author (Apr. 27, 2010, 4:05 PM) (on file with author). 
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increasingly likely that the case against Hidalgo and Lemus was a 
gigantic miscarriage of justice. 
The two convicted men were represented pro bono by a lawyer 
named Steve Cohen.  Cohen is a former federal prosecutor, and back in 
1996 he was present during Joey Pillot‘s queen-for-a-day revelation that 
he and Spanky Morales had committed the Palladium murder.  As 
Cohen explains it, his initial interest as a prosecutor 
was not that two innocent men were in jail, but that we 
wanted to use Joey as a witness in the C&C prosecution.  
I was concerned that we would need a state plea 
agreement as well as a federal agreement, because we 
couldn‘t fold the Palladium murder into a RICO 
charge.30 
But the Manhattan D.A.‘s office rebuffed Cohen when he and 
Addolorato alerted them about Pillot‘s confession.  When Cohen went 
into private practice as a litigator at the New York law firm Kronish Lieb 
Weiner & Hellman (now Cooley Godward Kronish), the case continued 
to weigh on his mind.  ―This is the only case I left behind that keeps me 
up at night, that plays on my conscience,‖ Cohen told a reporter in 
2000.31  After Lemus‘s mother began calling him, Cohen agreed to 
represent Lemus and Hidalgo pro bono.32  Addolorato, the police 
detective who first heard Joey Pillot‘s information, also stuck with the 
case for sixteen years, and he was in the courtroom when Lemus was 
ultimately acquitted.33  In Cohen‘s view, Addolorato was the true hero in 
the Palladium case.34 
Word of Feliciano‘s admission soon got to Cohen and to Lemus‘s 
trial lawyer, Eric Sears; as Cohen observes, the New York City criminal 
bar is a small world.35  In 2003, they went back to the Manhattan D.A.‘s 
office and spoke with ADA Stephen Saracco, the head of the Cold Case 
Unit who had argued the state‘s side at the 440 hearing.  Cohen urged 
Saracco that it was time for a new trial.  Saracco asked, ―Are you saying 
that these guys are actually innocent, or that they have a right to a new 
trial?‖  Cohen replied that they were actually innocent.36  Saracco agreed 
to open a new investigation, which he thought would take six weeks and 
                                                 
30 Id. 
31 Fritsch & Rohde, supra note 21. 
32 Cohen Interview, supra note 28. 
33 Hartocollis, Man Convicted, supra note 7. 
34 Cohen Interview, supra note 28. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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lead to a new 440 hearing.37  But Saracco retired, and the D.A.‘s office 
assigned the investigation to Daniel Bibb.  Bibb left a message on 
Cohen‘s voicemail: 
Steve this is Dan Bibb from the Manhattan D.A.‘s office.  
What I can tell you is that the investigation is 
proceeding.  There are interviews happening every day 
of people with information relevant to the investigation.  
I can also tell you that the investigation is not going to 
take weeks, it‘s going to take months.  If that‘s 
unfortunate for you, I apologize.38 
In fact, Bibb‘s investigation took not months, but years.  Bibb describes 
the investigation as follows:  ―Two detectives from the Manhattan South 
Homicide Squad and I ultimately interviewed over 60 people in 
connection with the investigation.  Interviews were conducted in at least 
fifteen states, three New York State prisons, eight federal prisons and 
one county jail, all of which were spread across the country.‖39  By the 
end of the investigation, Bibb was convinced that Lemus and Hidalgo 
had nothing to do with the Palladium shooting. 
Then why had Lemus told Delores Spencer that he was involved?  
According to Lemus, it was simply a pathetic story of talking big to 
impress a woman.  He was twenty-two years old at the time, and 
Spencer was thirty—a married mother of three children who, in Lemus‘s 
words, ―liked the gangster type and thugs.‖40  Lemus wanted to show 
Spencer that he was a tough guy and a player, not just a ―knucklehead 
with a bus pass.‖41  He had seen the news about the Palladium shooting 
on television, and it was the first thing that came to his mind.  Here is an 
exchange between Lemus and NBC Dateline producer Dan Slepian, 
whose special on the Palladium case gave it a national profile: 
Lemus:  ―I told her that I was at the Palladium, and there 
was a shootout that happened at the Palladium, and 
some people had got shot, and I told her that I was a 
part of that.‖ 
                                                 
37 Affirmation of Eric M. Sears at ¶13, People v. Lemus & Hidalgo, 2005 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 3611 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Oct. 12, 2004), available at http://www.cooley.com/files/ 
tbl_s5SiteRepository/FileUpload21/837/14_eric_affirmation.pdf. 
38 Phillips & Slepian, supra note 14. 
39 Letter from Daniel Bibb to Alan Friedberg, Departmental Disciplinary Comm., N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2 (Nov. 7, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bibb Letter]. 
40 Fritsch & Rohde, supra note 21. 
41 Phillips & Slepian, supra note 14. 
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Slepian:  ―Why say that?‖ 
Lemus:  ―I was trying to portray this image of somebody 
that I wasn‘t.‖ 
. . . . 
Lemus:  ―There‘s not a day that goes by that I don‘t say 
to myself, out of all the things you could have said to 
Delores that day, why the Palladium?  Eats you up.‖42 
Meanwhile, we can only guess what conversations were going on 
between Bibb and his superiors in the Manhattan D.A.‘s office, but they 
must have been tense and difficult.  Bibb, quite properly, will not talk 
about confidential office conversations. 
The D.A.‘s office did not dispute that Morales was the shooter.  
Rather, along the lines of the third-perpetrator theory, they told Bibb to 
defend the convictions and argue that all the men were in cahoots.  Bibb, 
on the other hand, was convinced that Lemus and Hidalgo had nothing 
to do with Morales and Pillot. 
Why not prosecute Spanky Morales?  This was a question the judge 
asked Bibb, and his answers hint at some of the disagreements that must 
have been going on in the D.A.‘s office: 
Judge Roger Hayes:  ―It is something that is puzzling to 
the court.‖ 
Bibb:  ―It is the subject of continuing discussion within 
my office.‖ 
Judge Hayes:  ―In other words, if your theory is correct, 
why is that person unprosecuted?‖ 
Bibb:  ―That also has been the subject of continuing 
discussions in my office.‖43 
Bibb explains that cases in which prosecutors delay indictment are 
extremely vulnerable to speedy trial and due process motions, and by 
this time the D.A.‘s office had collected significant evidence against 
Morales in the Palladium case for many years.44   
                                                 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Cf. People v. Singer, 376 N.E.2d 179 (N.Y. 1978).  In Singer, the court stated that: 
An untimely prosecution may be subject to dismissal even though, in 
the interim, the defendant was not formally accused, restrained or 
incarcerated for the offense.  Thus the State due process requirement of 
a prompt prosecution is broader than the right to a speedy trial 
guaranteed by statute and the Sixth Amendment. 
Id. at 186 (citations omitted). 
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Bibb says that he personally had no problem charging Morales, and 
in fact he was pushing for the indictment.45  As he puts it:  ―I always 
thought that in a homicide it‘s better to prosecute and lose on a motion 
than not to prosecute at all.  No dead body should go unpunished.‖46  
Presumably others in the office disagreed because they concluded that 
the indictment would be dismissed.   
 Finally—a few weeks before the new 440 hearing—police arrested 
Morales for his role in the Palladium homicide, and Bibb drew the 
assignment to prosecute him.47  As the D.A.‘s office foresaw, when 
Spanky Morales was finally indicted the judge dismissed the case on a 
so-called Singer speedy trial motion.48  Because of double jeopardy, 
Morales was safe and could testify in David Lemus‘s retrial.  Defense 
attorney Cohen believes that the reason the office finally indicted 
Morales is obvious:  his apparent guilt was going to come out in a matter 
of months at Lemus‘s and Hidalgo‘s 440 hearing, and it would look 
awful if prosecutors had allowed Morales to go unindicted.49 
The Palladium case was already an embarrassment to the D.A.‘s 
office as news stories over the years, including Dan Slepian‘s NBC 
Dateline special, had painted the convictions as a spectacular miscarriage 
of justice.50  It was embarrassing enough to become an issue in the re-
election campaign of District Attorney Robert Morgenthau.  Palladium 
was an embarrassment as well because of items that turned up in the 
case file.  First, as mentioned earlier, back in 1990 an anonymous tipster 
phoned a hotline to say that Spanky Morales was the shooter.51  No one 
ever pursued that lead, but the note was in the file.  Second, soon after 
the shooting, Morales‘s sister-in-law told police that Spanky was 
involved.52  Third, three of the state‘s own eyewitnesses had identified 
Morales from a photo array.53  However, Police Detective Victoria Garcia 
                                                 
45 Bibb E-mail, 5:18, supra note 13. 
46 Telephone Interview with Daniel Bibb (Apr. 14, 2010). 
47 Bibb E-mail, supra note 29. 
48 People v. Morales, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2812, *27 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Sept. 22, 
2006). 
49 Cohen Interview, supra note 28. 
50 See Phillips & Slepian, supra note 14 (―Fourteen years after the Palladium murder, it‘s 
up to the judge to decide did these men get a fair shake from the system.  Should they be 
set free?  Those are questions that weigh heavily on all those who have been drawn into the 
case.‖) 
51 See supra note 21. 
52 See Bibb Interview, supra note 46 (explaining that Morales‘s sister-in-law went to the 
police out of anger because, while her husband was in the military in Iraq, Spanky—her 
husband‘s brother—raped her). 
53 People v. Lemus & Hidalgo, 2005 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 3611, *39 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 
Oct. 25, 2005). 
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explained that she did not write a report about the photo array or a 
wanted card for Morales because it would weaken the state‘s case 
against Lemus and Hidalgo.54  It seemed that the police had bungled the 
investigation and then ignored evidence in its own files. 
All this led Lemus‘s and Hidalgo‘s attorneys to argue that the state 
had committed Brady violations by not revealing the evidence showing 
that Morales was the guilty man.  Here, however, Bibb was not inclined 
to play along with the defense.  In his own words, he ―fought the Brady 
allegations tooth and nail,‖ cross-examining Lemus‘s attorney, Eric 
Sears, for two full days.55  Bibb argued that prosecutors told the defense 
lawyers about Morales in a timely fashion, and the defense withdrew 
that portion of their Brady claim.56 Thus, whatever ways Bibb ―threw the 
case,‖ admitting police misconduct was not one of them. 
Bibb was clearly less comfortable advancing the state‘s theory that 
Morales, Lemus, and Hidalgo were all involved.  That is not surprising 
because, as we now know, Bibb was convinced that they were not.  ―I 
came to believe that Hidalgo wasn‘t there.  And if he wasn‘t there, he 
certainly couldn‘t have done it.‖57  At one point, the judge asked Bibb, 
―Is there any information in your possession that ties the defendant with 
each other or the C and C gang[?]‖ and Bibb responded ―Only in the 
most tenuous way.‖58  The men had all grown up in the same 
neighborhood and hung out at the same bars, but there was no evidence 
that Lemus and Hidalgo had anything to do with the gang.  ―Absent 
that,‖ Bibb stated, ―I‘ve been able to find no other connections.‖59  Bibb 
elaborates: 
Many of the witnesses that Lemus and Hidalgo called at 
the hearing were cooperating with me in the prosecution 
of Morales.  They included at least a half dozen 
witnesses who Morales admitted his participation to. As 
I explained when we spoke, the admissions Morales 
made to these witnesses . . . placed him in the role that 
                                                 
54 Id. at *34–35.  Garcia testified: 
It‘s not in the best interest of the NYPD to put a wanted card on a 
possible perp[etrator]. . . . I know from experience that once you do 
that, if he was the right guy, and I agree that that is what the case is 
here, you would have lost the case, right there, it would have been 
over. 
Id. 
55 Bibb Letter, supra note 39, at 5.   
56  People v. Lemus & Hidalgo, 2005 N.Y. Misc. Lexis, at *41–*42. 
57 Weiser, Settlement, supra note 9. 
58 Phillips & Slepian, supra note 14. 
59 Id. 
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Lemus was identified by the eyewitnesses as playing, 
that of the person hit by the bouncer and thrown out of 
the club.  You definitely cannot have two people playing 
the exact same role in a crime.  This is one of the reasons 
I was and remain convinced that Lemus was 
misidentified and Morales actually played that role. 
 For the sake of completeness, I am convinced that 
the four people involved in the crime were Thomas 
Morales aka Spanky (hit by [the] bouncer and thrown 
out of the club, gunman and active shooter), Joseph 
Pillot aka Joey (gunman whose gun misfired), Ramon 
Callejas aka Peachy (third gunman who did not fire his 
weapon and who looks a lot like Morales) and Richard 
Feliciano aka Richie (employed as a distraction so 
Spanky could try to get back into the club to kill the 
bouncer who actually hit him and threw him out of the 
club).  Lemus may very well have been there but, if he 
was, he was not involved.  Hidalgo was not there and 
was most likely having Thanksgiving dinner with a 
friend and his friend‘s wife.60 
These are the tangled events that led Bibb to throw the case.  
Contrary to news reports, he never ―coached‖ or ―strategized‖ with 
defense attorneys—by this time, Lemus and Hidalgo were represented 
not only by Steve Cohen‘s firm Cooley Godward Kronish but also by pro 
bono attorneys from Dickstein Shapiro—but he did speak with them 
about ―the evidence I had uncovered and my view as to what the 
evidence meant . . . . On a number of occasions, when they did not 
understand the import of a particular piece of evidence, I explained it to 
them.‖61  Gordon Mehler, one of Lemus‘s lawyers, confirmed Bibb‘s 
account when he told a reporter that ―If I make a mistake in my 
interpretation of what he said, he‘ll correct me . . . . If there‘s a piece of 
evidence that [bore] on another piece of evidence I‘m talking about, he‘ll 
remind me of it.  That‘s not something that a prosecutor typically 
does.‖62  Bibb also made sure that ―reluctant witnesses (and some were 
very reluctant) appeared and all the witnesses Lemus and Hidalgo called 
to testify on the newly discovered evidence issue were prepared and 
                                                 
60 Bibb E-mail, supra note 29. 
61 Bibb Letter, supra note 39, at 5. 
62 Weiser, Doubting Case, supra note 1. 
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testified truthfully.‖63  Bibb not only prepped the defense witnesses, he 
told them what he was going to ask them in his cross-examination.  Bibb 
comments: 
Did that feel weird?  Sure it did—but not that weird, 
because I‘ve prepared witnesses to testify a thousand 
times.  I always tell witnesses what questions to expect 
from the other side.  This time, I told them what 
questions to expect from the defense on direct, then I 
said ―Here are the questions you‘re going to get on 
cross.‖  A couple of the witnesses figured out what was 
going on.  They asked who was going to be crossing 
them, and I told them that I was.64 
Bibb did not try to undermine the eyewitnesses in his cross-
examination.  Both he and Cohen point out that he had a pragmatic 
reason for preserving their credibility; namely, that they would also be 
witnesses in his pending prosecution of Spanky Morales.65  But 
according to Bibb, his basic motive was that he wanted to lose. 
Cohen disputed that Bibb ―shot over the heads of the enemy‖:66 
[T]he notion that the ADA ―threw the case‖ is not 
accurate and belied by [Bibb‘s] conduct at the hearing 
and the positions he took before the judge.  Frankly, 
there was no[t] a prosecutor in the DA‘s Office who 
could have preserved those convictions.  To suggest 
otherwise does a disservice to the men and woman, 
esp[ecially] Detective Addolorato, who worked so hard 
to see justice done.67 
Cohen nevertheless agrees that Bibb went through a genuine crisis of 
conscience, and adds:  ―I did come to like and respect Dan Bibb.  He was 
an honorable person caught in a terrible situation.‖68 
How adversarial was Bibb?  He and Cohen disagree.  Steven Cohen 
writes, ―While Dan may want to believe that he ‗threw the case‘, it sure 
didn‘t look or feel that way in the courtroom.‖69  Bibb responds:  ―I 
                                                 
63 Bibb Letter, supra note 39, at 5.  Bibb names Eddit Troche, Mike Colomer, and Darrell 
Gray (a.k.a. Darrell Campbell) as reluctant witnesses.  Bibb E-mail, 1:57, supra note 13. 
64 Bibb Interview, supra note 46. 
65 Bibb Letter, supra note 39, at 5; Cohen E-mail, supra note 11. 
66 Cohen Interview, supra note 28. 
67 Cohen E-mail, supra note 11. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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would beg to differ.  He has nothing to base his opinion on other than 
the hearing.  He has never seen me try a case other than the hearing.‖70  
However, Bibb acknowledges that: 
[T]here were also some standard adversarial positions I 
had to take to satisfy my supervisors who were getting 
daily copies of the transcript delivered to them all the 
while knowing that the judge would rule in their favor.  
Some of those positions were taken half-heartedly and I 
knew the judge (who knows my courtroom take no 
prisoners style well) would realize that.71 
Why did Bibb handle the case the way he did?  Here is his own 
explanation, in a letter to bar disciplinary authorities: 
I felt that I had a number of choices.  The first was to 
resign.  While I am sure it would have garnered a lot of 
press coverage, it would not have moved the matter 
along to a just conclusion.  In fact, it most likely would 
have substantially delayed the matter, resulting in the 
continued incarceration of two innocent men.  The next 
was insubordination, refusing to do the hearing and risk 
being fired.  Practically speaking, neither of these was an 
option because I have a wife, three children, and a 
mortgage and college tuition to pay and could not afford 
to be out of work.  The last was to do exactly what I 
did.72 
He adds:  ―In this matter I did what every prosecutor should do, worked 
to ensure a just result consistent with my conscience, ethical principles 
and the evidence.‖73  Bibb recalls the events leading to his decision: 
Up until the day I was ordered to do the hearing I was 
confident that I would prevail in my efforts and that 
there would never be a hearing.  I truly believed that 
common sense would prevail. . . . The day I was ordered 
to do the hearing was the worst day of what was then a 
22 ½ year career as a prosecutor.  After I left work that 
day I called a friend who is a civil engineer (and knows 
                                                 
70 Bibb E-mail, 1:57, supra note 13. 
71 Bibb E-mail, 5:18, supra note 13. 
72 Bibb Letter, supra note 39, at 4. 
73 Id. at 5. 
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about the criminal justice system only what he sees on 
TV) and got together for a ‗few‘ drinks with him. . . . I 
mulled over and discussed with my pal resigning in 
protest, refusing to walk into the courtroom and letting 
them fire me or throwing the hearing. . . . I decided then 
that‘s what I would do.  That was in the first week of 
April 2005, a few weeks before the hearing began.74 
II.  ETHICS AND PROSECUTORS 
There is no doubt that what Dan Bibb did was unusual.  And there is 
no doubt that he violated the usual role expectations of the adversary 
system, where lawyers never try to help the other side make their case 
even when they think the other side is right.  But did Bibb do anything 
wrong? 
Stephen Gillers, a nationally-renowned legal ethics expert, thought 
he did and predicted that Bibb might face professional discipline.  ―He‘s 
entitled to his conscience,‖ Gillers wrote, ―but his conscience does not 
entitle him to subvert his client‘s case . . . . It entitles him to withdraw 
from the case, or quit if he can‘t.‖75  Bibb, on the other hand, said that he 
didn‘t withdraw because ―he worried that if he did not take the case, 
another prosecutor would—and possibly win.‖76   
Now I have great admiration for Stephen Gillers (with whom I have 
co-authored), but in this case I think he was wrong.  Daniel Bibb 
deserves a medal, not a reprimand. 
Before I explain why, let‘s see what the ethics case against Bibb 
might look like.  Imagine that a private lawyer representing a private 
client does the same thing.  She locates truthful but adverse witnesses 
and persuades them to testify.  As a matter of fact, she reveals her cross-
examination to them.  Not only that, she goes beyond minimally 
complying with her opponents‘ discovery requests—the civil 
counterpart to minimally fulfilling a prosecutor‘s Brady obligations.  She 
points out connections between pieces of evidence to the opposing 
lawyers.  The lawyer does it because she thinks the other side was right, 
and her client loses. 
There is no question that the lawyer could and would be sued for 
malpractice.  As for ethics violations, the lawyer could be charged with 
several:  violating the requirement of competency;77 the requirement that 
                                                 
74 Bibb E-mail, 1:57, supra note 13. 
75 Weiser, Doubting Case, supra note 1. 
76 Id. 
77 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002).  Here and in the remainder of the 
paragraph I cite to the Model Rules rather than New York‘s Code of Professional 
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the client, not the lawyer, sets the goals of the representation;78 the 
requirement of diligence (also known as ―zeal,‖ although the Model 
Rules do not use that word in their text);79 and the conflict of interest 
provision forbidding lawyers from taking cases where the lawyer‘s 
representation of the client will be ―materially limited‖ by ―a personal 
interest of the lawyer.‖80  Conceivably she could also be charged with 
using client confidences against the client‘s interests, if any of her 
conduct was based on confidential information from the client.81  And, if 
the lawyer kept her strategy secret from her law firm—which expected 
her to zealously represent the client‘s position—she was engaging in 
deceit, which the ethics rules prohibit.82 
In short, the lawyer in private practice would face a mountain of 
ethics charges. 
All the same prohibitions apply to a prosecutor, but there is one 
crucial difference:  prosecutors are not supposed to win at all costs.  In a 
time-honored formula, their job is to seek justice, not victory.  This is a 
mantra that appears in all the crucial ethics documents.  It appears in a 
comment to the current ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct:  ―A 
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply 
that of an advocate.‖83  It appears in the Model Rules‘ predecessor, the 
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility:  ―The responsibility of a public 
prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek 
justice, not merely to convict.‖84  The same language appears in the 
ABA‘s Standards for the Prosecution Function.85 
The ancestor of all these pronouncements is the Supreme Court‘s 
dictum in a 1935 case, Berger v. United States: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of 
an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty 
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling 
                                                                                                             
Responsibility, the operative rules in Bibb‘s jurisdiction.  I do so for the sake of generality 
and simplicity; the relevant New York rules do not differ from the Model Rules in any way 
that matters for the points I am raising. 
78 Id. R. 1.2(a). 
79 Id. R. 1.3. 
80 Id. R. 1.7(a)(2). 
81 Id. R. 1.8(b). 
82 Id. R. 8.4(c). 
83 Id. R. 3.8 cmt. 
84 MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mcpr.pdf. 
85 AM. BAR ASS‘N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND 
DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993) (―The duty of the prosecutor is to seek 
justice, not merely to convict.‖). 
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as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done.  As such, he is 
in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the 
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not 
escape or innocence suffer.86 
This is a very different way to think about a lawyer‘s role in the 
adversary system than we are used to in other contexts.  It is especially 
different from the criminal defense attorney‘s role, which most lawyers 
and scholars agree requires maximum zeal on the client‘s behalf.87  Now 
in one way, this stark difference between the prosecutor‘s mission and 
the mission assigned to other advocates in the adversary system is 
obvious:  the criminal justice system would be a travesty if a prosecutor, 
holding years of someone‘s life in her hands, cared about nothing but 
notching another victory. 
But I do want to point out that the Berger dictum, with its ―seek 
justice not victory‖ formula, runs entirely against the grain of popular 
anti-crime sentiment as well as the way people commonly think about 
the adversary system.  In popular sentiment, criminals are by definition 
bad guys, prosecutors who lock them up are, for that reason, good guys, 
and defense lawyers live under a perpetual cloud of suspicion, reflected 
in endless griping about clever lawyers who get crooks off on 
technicalities.  Criminal defenders constantly face the question ―[h]ow 
can you represent people like that?‖—or the more sophisticated law 
student‘s version, ―I understand why the system needs defense lawyers, 
but personally I could never do that kind of work.‖  As for our 
conventional understanding of the adversary system, it envisions 
complete symmetry of obligation between the two sides:  they are both 
supposed to fight as hard as they can to win. 
The ―seek justice not victory‖ formula, coupled with the view that 
criminal defense requires the maximum level of zealous advocacy, 
presents an entirely upside down model.  Now, we have asymmetrical 
obligations:  the defender is supposed to seek victory, not justice, while 
                                                 
86 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also Bruce A. Green, Why Should 
Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 612–13 (1999).  Although Berger is the 
locus classicus of the ―seek justice not victory‖ principle, it dates back at least to the 
nineteenth century.  Id. 
87 William H. Simon is a prominent exception who does not distinguish the criminal 
defender‘s obligations from those of other lawyers and whose overall view is that all 
lawyers should be guided, like prosecutors, by the ethical principle of seeking justice not 
victory.  WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE:  A THEORY OF LAWYERS‘ ETHICS 
(2000).   
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the prosecutor is constrained to seek justice, not victory.  Prosecutors, it 
seems, are simply not supposed to fight to win the way defenders are. 
Admittedly, there is a delphic quality to the ―seek justice not 
victory‖ formula.  Justice is a grandiose and vague word.  Oliver 
Wendell Holmes famously said ―I hate justice, which means that I know 
if a man begins to talk about that, for one reason or another he is shirking 
thinking in legal terms.‖88  The formal ethics rules—as opposed to 
aspirational standards like the ABA‘s Standards for the Prosecution 
Function—take a pretty minimalist view of the prosecutor‘s obligations.  
Prosecutors should not proceed without probable cause, they should 
make a reasonable effort to ensure that the accused has been informed of 
his rights, they should not try to get an unrepresented person to waive 
rights, and they should do timely Brady disclosures.89  They should not 
subpoena defense lawyers unless they have to.90  And they should 
refrain from inflammatory public comments about their cases—a rule all 
too often honored in the breach.91  In most jurisdictions, that is the extent 
of their ethical obligations.  These rules leave loads of leeway for 
prosecutors to seek victory regardless of justice, without facing even a 
whiff of professional discipline.  As Bibb notes, ―I could have done a lot 
of things both inside and outside the courtroom that would have been 
perfectly legal and ethical to frustrate their [the defense lawyers‘] efforts.  
The fact is that I didn‘t do them . . . .‖92 
Fred Zacharias, in a leading scholarly article on the ―seek justice not 
victory‖ formula, thinks that the justice prosecutors seek ―has two fairly 
limited prongs:  (1) prosecutors should not prosecute unless they have a 
good faith belief that the defendant is guilty; and, (2) prosecutors must 
ensure that the basic elements of the adversary system exist at trial.‖93  
The formal ethics rules do not go even that far. 
And yet I have spoken with a lot of prosecutors who take ―seek 
justice not victory‖ seriously, even if they are not 100% confident they 
know exactly what it requires.  At the very least, as Zacharias‘s first 
point indicates, they know you should not try to keep people behind 
bars if you think they didn‘t do it. 
In 2008, the ABA House of Delegates agreed.  The ABA added two 
Model Rules to deal with prosecutors‘ obligations when new evidence 
                                                 
88 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John C.H. Wu (July 1, 1929), in JUSTICE HOLMES 
TO DOCTOR WU:  AN INTIMATE CORRESPONDENCE, 1921–32, at 53 (1947). 
89 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a)–(d) (2008). 
90 Id. R. 3.8(e). 
91 Id. R. 3.8(f). 
92 Bibb E-mail, 1:57, supra note 13. 
93 Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:  Can Prosecutors 
Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 49 (1991). 
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suggests that they obtained wrongful convictions.  One requires a 
prosecutor who learns of ―new, credible and material evidence creating a 
reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an 
offense of which the defendant was convicted,‖ to disclose the evidence 
to the proper authorities as well as the defendant and to initiate an 
investigation.94  If the evidence is clear and convincing, the prosecutor 
must ―seek to remedy the conviction.‖95  Two prominent scholars have 
argued that these rules do not go far enough because evidence that a 
convicted person is probably innocent should impel a conscientious 
prosecutor to try to remedy the injustice, even if the evidence is not clear 
and convincing.96 
These rules are rather new, and to date only three states have 
adopted them.97  Furthermore, it seems perfectly clear that the ABA was 
not thinking of Bibb‘s unorthodox tactics as the way a lawyer should 
―seek to remedy the conviction.‖98  But what, after all, did Bibb do 
wrong?  He persuaded reluctant witnesses to show up in court and 
testify against the state.  Think for a moment about the alternative.  Bibb 
was assigned to investigate the Palladium case, and he went on an 
odyssey to track down the witnesses:  sixty interviews, fifteen states, 
eleven prisons, one county jail.99  Once he had the evidence, he was 
under an obligation to turn it over to the defense if it was exculpatory—
which he did. 
The alternatives:  don‘t investigate the case very well for fear you 
will find out that the men doing 25-years-to-life are innocent; or, having 
investigated it, don‘t turn over the exculpatory evidence to the defense, 
violating your constitutional and ethical obligations; or, having turned it 
over, put the defense to the difficulty of locating the witnesses and 
getting them to court—so, if the defenders do not succeed, the truth stays 
buried.  That is the ethical obligation of a public prosecutor? 
I hope your answer to my rhetorical question is no, but it may not be.  
A great many lawyers think that putting the other side to the effort and 
expense of getting witnesses to court is exactly what the adversary 
system contemplates.  Sometimes, people quote a line from the Supreme 
                                                 
94 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g). 
95 Id. R. 3.8(h). 
96 Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction 
Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 508 (2009). 
97 E.g., DEL. LAW. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d)(2) (2010); WIS. RULES OF PROF‘L 
CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS, SCR 20:  3.8(g)–(h)(2010) ; see also COLO. R. CIV. P. app. ch. 18–20 
(omitting the duty to initiate an investigation and thus establishing a slightly weaker duty 
than in ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8(g) and (h)). 
98 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8(h). 
99 Bibb Letter, supra note 39, at 2. 
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Court‘s decision in Hickman v. Taylor, that ―a learned profession‖ is not 
supposed ―to perform its functions . . . on wits borrowed from the 
adversary.‖100 
I think the Palladium case is a good illustration of how absurd this 
dictum is.  Bibb persuaded reluctant witnesses—not all of whom were 
solid citizens—to testify truthfully.101  Would not doing so have impeded 
the search for truth?  As I noted above, Steve Cohen believes that the 
favorable result in the 440 hearing was ―pre-ordained,‖102 but Bibb 
responds, ―I am sure you know that nothing is pre-ordained in the 
criminal justice system.‖103  It really doesn‘t matter who is right.  Bibb 
feared a grotesque injustice—otherwise he had no motive to hold his fire 
any way—and for a lawyer facing such a situation, thinking the result is 
pre-ordained is a luxury you cannot afford, whether or not it is true.  
Getting key witnesses onto the stand is exactly what was required to 
seek justice not victory in this case. 
One hundred and eighty years ago, John Stuart Mill criticized jurists 
who looked at the adversary system through ―fox-hunting eyes,‖ as if it 
were nothing more than ―a sort of game, partly of chance, partly of 
skill.‖104  That fox hunter‘s outlook seems to be the Supreme Court‘s in 
Hickman v. Taylor, and it is also the outlook of anyone who thinks the 
prosecutor‘s job is to stand pat and let the defense get the witnesses to 
testify—if they can.  Years ago, when I first began studying the 
adversary system, I thought that if this is what lawyering in an 
adversary system means, it is a large strike against the adversary system.  
I still think so.  But even if you are a bigger fan than I am of the 
adversary system, you should agree that standing pat in this case would 
have violated the prosecutor‘s special responsibility to seek justice not 
victory. 
Admittedly, it is odd to have the prosecutor discuss with the defense 
how the evidence fits together, and odder still to tell witnesses what he 
plans to ask them on cross-examination.  Notice something important, 
though:  in this case, Bibb‘s tactics advanced the search for truth and the 
                                                 
100 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).  The Court was referring specifically 
to discovery rules, but it set its discussion in the more general context that ―a common law 
trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding.‖  Id. 
101 Bibb Interview, supra note 46.  Cohen doubts that Bibb had a better relationship with 
the witnesses than he did, after his many years working on the case.  Cohen Interview, 
supra note 28.  Bibb, however, disagrees.  Bibb E-mail, 1:57, supra note 13. 
102 Cohen E-mail, supra note 11. 
103 Bibb E-mail, 1:57, supra note 13. 
104 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY APPLIED TO ENGLISH 
PRACTICE 317–18 (Mill annot.) (1827). 
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protection of rights.  These are precisely the two values that defenders of 
the adversary system argue it is there to promote.105 
In truth, Bibb‘s conduct may not be so extraordinary.  A former 
federal prosecutor tells me that it is not unusual for prosecutors to throw 
cases at the grand jury stage because they think the case stinks, but they 
are under pressure to take it to the grand jury.  That is less conspicuous 
than Bibb throwing the case at a public hearing, but morally it is hard to 
see the difference. 
An important point is lurking in the background here.  One reason 
some lawyers feel uncomfortable with the adage ―seek justice not 
victory‖ is that there is no consensus about what justice is, and we have 
every reason to doubt there ever will be.  Philosophers who spend their 
lives thinking about the theory of justice don‘t agree about whose theory 
is right.  But you do not need a philosophical theory of justice to 
recognize gross injustice when you see it.  Our sense of injustice is more 
basic, less controversial, and less dependent on philosophical arguments 
than propositions about justice.106  ―Avoid injustice‖ might be a more 
useful imperative than ―seek justice,‖ even if it is less catchy and less 
inspirational.  It is probably what prosecutors actually do when they take 
―seek justice not victory‖ seriously. 
III.  WHY SHOULD PROSECUTORS SEEK JUSTICE, NOT VICTORY? 
Scholars have advanced two theories for why the prosecutor‘s job is 
to seek justice not victory.107  One points to the power differential 
between the state and the accused individual.  The state has tremendous 
resources:  police to investigate cases, crime labs to examine evidence, 
                                                 
105 Of course, the reader may wonder whether greater cooperation among lawyers would 
enhance the search for truth and the protection of rights across a wide range of cases.  That 
is an excellent question, and it is part of the reason that I have doubts about the adversary 
system.  See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 19–64 (2009) [hereinafter 
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS]; DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:  AN ETHICAL STUDY 67–92 
(1988). 
106 JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE (1990); see also AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF 
JUSTICE iix, 21 (2009) (asserting that ―prevention of manifest injustice‖ is more important 
than seeking perfect justice).  Roberto Unger once wrote about the ―basic, common 
experience in modern society . . . of being surrounded by injustice without knowing where 
justice lies‖—an acknowledgment that our sense of injustice is keener than our 
understanding of justice.  ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY:  
TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 175 (1976); see also STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE 
AND EXPERIENCE 106 (1989) (arguing that even though people cannot agree on a theory of 
the good, everyone can recognize the great evils).  Hampshire writes, ―every population of 
intelligent persons should be a patchwork of minorities in the pursuit of deviant 
conceptions of the good, held together by a shared respect for fairness.‖  Id. at 132. 
107 Green, supra note 86, at 625–37. 
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and—of course—the charging power to flip witnesses and induce plea 
bargains.  The accused typically has an overworked defender with little 
or no capacity to investigate; in many cases, the accused is in jail.  Even 
the names attached to criminal cases show the power imbalance:  State v. 
Defendant, People v. Defendant, United States v. Defendant.  Because of the 
power imbalance, it is essential that prosecutors not take victory as their 
sole goal.  Call this the power theory. 
The other theory focuses not on the power imbalance between the 
government and the accused, but on the special duty of the executive to 
govern justly and impartially.  That is the theory in the Berger case, 
which I quoted earlier:  the prosecutor ―is the representative not of an 
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to 
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all.‖108  
Call this the sovereignty theory. 
In my view, neither theory tells the whole story.  The sovereignty 
theory does not explain why prosecutors, seeking victory in an 
adversary contest where the defense is doing the same, are not 
governing impartially.  Why isn‘t procedural justice within in the 
adversary system all the justice prosecutors need to seek?  Surely part of 
the explanation is the power imbalance:  giving the state most of the 
cards in a purely competitive contest, where the only goal is victory, 
means that it will win even when the defense would prevail in a more 
even context.  So the sovereignty theory needs the power theory to back 
it up—otherwise, it does not adequately explain why prosecutors should 
seek justice not victory. 
Conversely, the power theory does not explain what is wrong with a 
pro-government power imbalance, which, after all, many people think is 
the best way to fight crime.  The answer must be that we want more 
from government than fighting crime:  we want government to bend 
over backwards to achieve fairness and avoid collateral damage to the 
innocent in the war against crime.  In other words, the power theory 
needs the sovereignty theory to back it up. 
In short, each theory needs the other.  But even combining them 
leaves out something essential:  the stakes are so much higher in criminal 
law than anywhere else.  We have one of the world‘s harshest criminal 
justice systems, with lengthy sentences, draconian conditions of 
confinement, little if any interest in rehabilitation, loss of rights to 
convicted felons even after they serve their time, and stigma that follows 
convicts forever, blighting their chances to make a fresh start.  As 
everyone knows or should know, the United States currently has more 
                                                 
108 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
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people locked up than any nation in history, both per capita and in 
absolute numbers. 
But the United States also has a constitution built on principles of 
limited government and individual rights.  It is an interesting puzzle 
how the same country that traditionally fears government abuse and 
rallies around the libertarian slogan ―don‘t tread on me!‖ can at the same 
time be so addicted to harsh punishment—but this is not the occasion to 
address the puzzle.109 
Instead, I want to emphasize that the protection of individual rights 
from government abuse is a key part of our political tradition, and the 
harshness of our punishments makes the protection of rights in the 
criminal process a matter of life and death.  That is why the power 
imbalance in the criminal justice system and the government‘s 
commitment to impartiality are so important.  ―Seek justice not victory‖ 
weaves together all three concerns.  Prosecutors should not exploit the 
power imbalance, and they should care immensely about the rights of 
the accused, including the substantive right to stay out of jail when you 
are innocent, because of the enormously high stakes in these cases.  
Every good prosecutor understands that she holds years of a person‘s 
life in her hands. 
Obviously, prosecutors are not responsible for mass incarceration—
they deal with criminal cases retail, not wholesale, and legislatures‘ 
addiction to ratcheting up punishments is not the prosecutor‘s fault.  But 
the prosecutor is the gatekeeper of the system, the one who decides 
which cases go from the paddy wagon to the courtroom.  The 
prosecutor‘s conscience is the invisible guardian of our rights, just as the 
defense lawyer is the visible guardian.  What made Bibb‘s conduct in the 
Palladium case so remarkable is that here, the invisible guardian became 
visible. 
IV.  IS HIERARCHY PROCESS?—OR, WHO DECIDES WHAT JUSTICE IS? 
I hope I have adequately explained why prosecutors must seek 
justice, not merely victory.  But to this point, I have left out one crucial 
piece of the story:  Bibb was working in a law office, and his superiors in 
the chain of command disagreed with him.  Granted that prosecutors 
must seek justice, who decides what justice is?  Isn‘t that a decision for 
the boss rather than an Assistant D.A.? 
                                                 
109 For an ambitious attempt at an explanation, see generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH 
JUSTICE:  CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND 
EUROPE (2003) (tracing the difference between U.S. and European penal practices to a 
different cultural approaches to egalitarianism). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2010], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss1/1
2010] The Conscience of a Prosecutor 23 
When I blogged about Bibb and the Palladium case in 2008, several 
ethics experts objected that I was wrong to ignore the hierarchy of the 
D.A.‘s office.  John Steele, a founder of the blog Legal Ethics Forum, put it 
this way: 
 Suppose . . . a subordinate lawyer thinks that the 
evidence doesn‘t meet the high threshold a prosecutor 
should have before trying a defendant—but the 
supervisory lawyer disagrees. . . .  
 Should the subordinate lawyer accede to the 
supervisor‘s orders and try the case, ask to be moved to 
another case, resign from the organization, or secretly 
subvert the supervisor‘s orders while pretending to 
follow them? 
 The only answer I can‘t support is the last one.  It‘s 
deceit on the supervisor, deceit on the organization, and 
deceit on the court.110 
Law professor Marty Lederman, a former Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General in the Department of Justice‘s Office of Legal Counsel, agrees: 
 The prosecutor here was the elected Manhattan 
D.A., who chose to go ahead with the prosecution. . . .  
 . . . [L]et‘s assume, as we must here, that the D.A. was 
not persuaded by Bibb, and concluded that the 
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 At that point, Bibb is acting as an agent of the D.A.  If 
he firmly believes his supervisor was wrong, Steele is 
correct that he can—perhaps should—ask to be removed 
from the case, or resign.  If he thinks the D.A. is willfully 
acting unlawfully, perhaps he should even make a stink 
about [it] to the relevant authorities or in public. 
 But act as an unfaithful agent? . . .  
 This may not be an ethics violation—but it‘s a 
violation of one‘s contract with the principal, a violation 
                                                 
110 John Steele, Comment to When a Good Prosecutor Throws a Case, BALKINIZATION (June 
24, 2008, 6:37 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/when-good-prosecutor-throws-
case.html. 
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of agency principles, and, as you concede, a fraud on the 
D.A.111 
And Stephen Gillers wrote this: 
Morgenthau speaks for the client, the People.  He was 
elected not Bibb.  It is analogous to a CEO or Board 
speaking for the company. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . Would David support a Bibb-like act in the next case 
if another assistant threw the case honestly convinced 
that it is what justice required, ignoring contrary 
instruction, and it turned out that the freed person really 
was factually guilty?  We law professors have the luxury 
of living in a more or less hierarchy-free world, but in 
the ‗real life‘ of big law offices, including government 
ones, hierarchy is process.112 
It would take another lecture as long as this one to fully respond to 
these comments, but my basic answer is very simple.  I agree that if you 
work in an organization—at any rate a decent organization—you should 
generally respect the chain of command.  And if your supervisors reach a 
different conclusion than you about the same evidence, you should 
earnestly consider whether their judgment might be better or more 
objective than yours. 
But sometimes it may happen that your certainty remains 
unshakeable, even when you have tried as hard as you can to see it their 
way.  And sometimes the magnitude of the injustice is intolerable.  
Lastly, once in a great while, nobody can stop the injustice but you.  At 
that point, the demands of conscience, and indeed of human decency, 
prevail over the office hierarchy. 
In the Palladium case, no prosecutor knew the facts and evidence as 
well as Bibb.  He had met the witnesses, he had spent hours sizing them 
up, he had lived with the case for two years.  Of course as an abstract 
matter, he might have read the evidence wrong and his supervisors 
might have been right.  But in the real world, this abstract possibility was 
negligible.  His supervisors had little or nothing to go on except the 
                                                 
111 Marty Lederman, Comment to When a Good Prosecutor Throws a Case, BALKINIZATION, 
(June 25, 2008, 7:36 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/when-good-prosecutor-
throws-case.html. 
112 Stephen Gillers, Comment to When a Good Prosecutor Throws a Case, BALKINIZATION, 
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information that Bibb gave them plus the facts that the defense lawyers 
and Detective Addolorato had compiled over the years. 
Bibb rejects the accusation that he was an unfaithful agent, because 
―given [their] many discussions about the matter‖ his superiors 
―certainly knew the result [he] wanted and intended to seek.‖113  Why 
his supervisors did not follow Bibb‘s recommendation remains the great 
mystery of the Palladium case.  Maybe it was bureaucratic inertia.  
Maybe it was reluctance to confess error.  Maybe no one wanted to be 
the one to step up and pull the plug on the case.  Cohen suspects that 
decision makers in the office regarded defense efforts as a personal 
attack on the D.A.‘s office and the legendary district attorney Robert 
Morgenthau.114  What seems inconceivable is that anyone in the D.A.‘s 
office looked at Bibb‘s evidence as hard as he did and concluded beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Lemus and Hidalgo were the killers. 
As for the size of the injustice:  if Bibb was right, two innocent men 
had spent fourteen years in prison for a crime they had not committed, 
and were looking at many more years.  Injustice doesn‘t get much 
grosser than that. 
Next, consider the magnitude of whatever wrong Bibb did by 
throwing the case.  It isn‘t large.  As I hope I have made clear, throwing 
the case meant that Bibb did what he could to make sure that the 
reluctant witnesses testified and the truth came out.  And he refrained 
from discrediting the truthful witnesses in cross-examination.  The 
wrong, in other words, consisted almost entirely of improving the search 
for truth.  The deceit on the supervisor, if it existed, lay in letting the 
supervisor believe that Bibb was going to let truthful testimony stay 
buried.  This strikes me as a trivial sin, if it is a sin at all.  The deceit on 
the court was nonexistent. 
Finally, Bibb feared that no other prosecutor could have or would 
have gotten all the witnesses to testify.  If he withdrew, Lemus and 
Hidalgo might still be in prison.  Most lawyers I have spoken with about 
this case instinctively think that if you cannot in good conscience go 
forward with a case, the only ethical thing to do is withdraw.  With due 
respect, I think this dodges the full force of the dilemma:  what if 
withdrawing would perpetuate the injustice?  There is a familiar law 
school joke about what students should do if they have to guess at an 
answer on the MPRE:  when in doubt, always pick the second most 
ethical of the four choices.  In the Palladium case, that would have been 
withdrawing. 
                                                 
113 Bibb E-mail, supra note 29. 
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Of course, if Steve Cohen is correct, no prosecutor could have 
defended the Lemus and Hidalgo convictions, and Bibb could have 
safely withdrawn.  Bibb did not see it that way; ―he worried that if he 
did not take the case, another prosecutor would—and possibly win.‖115  
Moreover, Bibb‘s previously quoted letter points out that withdrawing 
would have caused further delays and left Lemus and Hidalgo in prison 
longer.116  Finally, withdrawing from a case receiving intense media 
scrutiny would have been tantamount to revealing the sharp split 
between Bibb and his superiors, and he may have concluded that that 
would do more damage to his office than the course he actually 
pursued.117 
Alternatively, Bibb might have presented the case with full 
adversarial vigor, but then told the judge his own personal view that the 
men were innocent.118  But in this case, proceeding with full adversarial 
vigor would mean not persuading the witnesses to testify or, if they did 
testify, going after them in cross-examination to discredit what they said.  
Either way, the result might have been a grave injustice.119  In any event, 
it strikes me as odder than what Bibb did for a lawyer to discredit new 
exculpatory evidence as strongly as possible, present a closing statement 
arguing that the evidence supports the convictions (as full adversarial 
vigor requires), but then assert a personal belief—based, presumably, on 
the same evidence—that the men are innocent. 
The basic problem with viewing hierarchy as process is that 
organizations, including good organizations, can malfunction badly.  
The record of the Palladium case, reviewed in the published judicial 
opinions as well as numerous news stories, shows astonishing resistance 
to the truth in the police and the D.A.‘s office stretching over many 
years.  Detective Garcia had information that Morales and Pillot were the 
shooters virtually from the beginning of the investigation but did not 
properly memorialize it.  The D.A.‘s office repeatedly rebuffed Detective 
                                                 
115 Weiser, Doubting Case, supra note 1. 
116 Bibb Letter, supra note 39, at 4. 
117 Bibb also makes clear that with bills to pay he did not want to leave his job, which 
would have been the inevitable outcome of a withdrawal that embarrassed the D.A.‘s 
office.  Id.  This, of course, is not a justification for choosing the course of action he did, but 
it is a perfectly understandable excuse. 
118 See Melanie D. Wilson, Finding a Happy and Ethical Medium Between a Prosecutor Who 
Believes the Defendant Didn’t Do It and the Boss Who Says That He Did, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 65, 
69–70 (2008) (proposing that prosecutors present the opinions of their office to the court but 
then offer their own independent perspective). 
119 In the Palladium case, the judge at one point did ask Bibb what he thought, and he 
replied, ―[t]he position of the District Attorney is . . . .‖  Bibb Interview, supra note 46.  Then 
the judge responded ―[b]ut what do you think?‖  Id.  Bibb again answered, ―[t]he position 
of the D.A.‘s office is . . . .‖  Id.  Presumably, his message got across. 
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Addolorato and, later, Cohen.  At the first 440 hearing, the office pressed 
the third-shooter theory, despite the lack of evidence of any connection 
between Lemus, Hidalgo, and Morales.  Steve Cohen points to ―years of 
Detective Addolorato (who was still then with the NYPD), the defense 
team and Dan Slepian (from Dateline NBC) amassing evidence 
demonstrating that the wrong men were in jail, of producing that 
evidence to the Manhattan DAs office, of watching as the evidence was 
ignored, [and] of being subjected to unwarranted and inexcusable 
delay.‖120  Cohen believes that even the assignment of Dan Bibb to 
reinvestigate the case as thoroughly as he did was a delaying tactic by 
the D.A.‘s office. 
What explains the evident dysfunction in a generally impressive 
office?  Cohen provides background about why the D.A.‘s office was 
originally resistant to his information about Joey Pillot‘s confession:  
there was a long-standing rivalry between the D.A.‘s office and the 
Eastern and Southern Districts‘ U.S. Attorney‘s offices (and, he adds, the 
FBI).  ―The complexity was that we [the U.S. Attorney‘s office] were 
bringing gang cases [when Cohen was involved in the federal 
investigation of C&C].  Manhattan thought we were treading on their 
turf; they had the expertise—and in part they were right about that.  We 
had resolved this friction in the Bronx, but not in Manhattan.‖121  Then, 
over the years, as the injustice to Lemus and Hidalgo became greater, it 
became harder rather than easier for the office to admit error or 
incompetence—a familiar psychological dynamic in which people 
become invested in their own earlier decisions.122 
Cohen writes, ―During my years dealing with the Palladium case, I 
was continually reminded of the work of Stanley Milgram and Philip 
Zimbardo, the social scientists who conducted obedience experiments.  
Unfortunately, (I fear) what might be learned from this tragedy is missed 
time and again.‖123  The experiments he refers to are classics of social 
psychology, studying the dynamics by which structures of authority and 
role undermine moral judgment.124  In Milgram‘s obedience experiments, 
                                                 
120 Cohen E-mail, supra note 11.  The author corrected minor typos in this quote from the 
e-mail, which Cohen wrote on a Blackberry. 
121 Cohen Interview, supra note 28. 
122 See Jonathan L. Freedman & Scott C. Fraser, Compliance Without Pressure:  The Foot-in-
the-Door Technique, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 195 (1966) (describing one version of 
this phenomenon, called the ―foot-in-the-door‖ effect of which Freedman and Fraser‘s is 
the classic experiment). 
123 Cohen E-mail, supra note 11. 
124 For discussions of psychological obedience studies, see generally STANLEY MILGRAM, 
OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY:  AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (Perennial 2004) (1974); ARTHUR G. 
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Luban: The Conscience of a Prosecutor
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
28 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
subjects ordered to administer escalating, possibly lethal electrical shocks 
to other subjects (who were actually confederates of the experimenter—
and the shocks were fake) found it very hard to break off.  Indeed, two-
thirds of them went all the way to the highest voltage.  Milgram‘s 
explanation was that ―if he breaks off, he must say to himself:  
‗Everything I have done to this point is bad, and I now acknowledge it 
by breaking off.‘  But if he goes on, he is reassured about his past 
performance.‖125  This may well have been the psychology in the D.A.‘s 
office.  Even if hierarchy is process, it can be a terribly flawed process:  
good when it works, but incapable of self-correction when it does not. 
V.  THE SOCRATIC IDEAL 
I now turn to my final question, perhaps the hardest question in 
legal ethics.  What role does conscience play in lawyer‘s ethics, when 
conscience presses one way but the professional rules press the other? 
In the Western philosophical tradition, the first and greatest 
discussion of conscience is the Apology of Socrates, as related by Plato.126  
Standing accused before an Athenian court, Socrates told the jurors 
about his daimon, ―a sort of voice that comes to me, and when it comes it 
always holds me back from what I am thinking of doing, but never urges 
me forward.‖127  Socrates explained that his daimon ―always spoke to me 
very frequently and opposed me even in very small matters, if I was 
going to do anything I should not . . . .‖128  What Socrates was describing 
is the voice of conscience. 
The basic principle of Socratic ethics is that it is worse to do wrong 
than to suffer wrong.129  In the Apology, Socrates reminds his jurors of 
two episodes that nearly cost him his life.  Once, when he held a public 
office, the Athenians wanted to put some generals on trial illegally, and 
Socrates was the only one to oppose them.  ―I thought I must run the risk 
to the end with law and justice on my side, rather than join with you 
                                                                                                             
Stanford University, STANFORD PRISON EXPERIMENT, http://www.prisonexp.org/ (last 
visited July 28, 2010) (discussing the Stanford Prison Experiment).  Zimbardo‘s more recent 
book discusses the Stanford Prison Experiment as well as other relevant studies in social 
psychology.  PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT:  UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD 
PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2008).  For my analysis of these and other experiments relevant to 
organizational pathologies, see DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 105, at 239–97. 
125 MILGRAM, supra note 124, at 149. 
126 The Apology, in PLATO, EUTHYPHRO ∙ APOLOGY ∙ CRITO ∙ PHAEDO ∙ PHAEDRUS 61–146 
(G.P. Goold ed., Harold North Fowler trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1990) (1914). 
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128 Id. at 139. 
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when your wishes were unjust . . . .‖130  On another occasion, the 
dictators of Athens ordered Socrates and some others to arrest a man 
named Leon and bring him to be illegally executed.  As Socrates reminds 
the jury, ―when we came out of the rotunda, the other four went to 
Salamis and arrested Leon, but I simply went home . . . .‖131 
Both times, Socrates defied public authority to avoid participating in 
wrongful criminal punishments.  The examples no doubt infuriated his 
jurors, because of course Socrates was arguing that his own conviction 
would be unjust, and the examples were an ironic rebuke to those who 
were about to convict him.132  Ironic or not, the examples show us 
something crucial:  the paradigm case of conscience lies in refusing to 
acquiesce in the wrongful conviction of the innocent. 
Of course I am not comparing Dan Bibb to Socrates.  Bibb is an 
unpretentious, plainspoken lawyer, and he would undoubtedly find the 
comparison embarrassing and absurd.  Hopefully any of us would.  My 
point is the striking fact that when Socrates illustrates his conscience at 
work, he picks examples where public authorities wanted him to 
participate in wrongful convictions.  You might say that these are the 
original conscience cases. 
Bibb was not a chronic malcontent.  He was a career prosecutor who 
liked his job and believed in its value.  Bibb let me know that he is a 
conservative with a strong law and order bent.  Cohen describes Bibb as 
the kind of prosecutor who did not habitually resolve borderline 
judgments in a defendant‘s favor.  Bibb may well have gone into the 
Palladium investigation inclined to defend the convictions if the 
evidence of innocence was less than clear.  That would explain why his 
investigation was so long and thorough—from Cohen‘s standpoint, 
longer than it needed to be, given the amount of evidence the defense 
had already amassed showing that Morales and Pillot were the true 
culprits and had nothing to do with Lemus and Hidalgo.133  As a veteran 
of the office who had worked with Stephen Saracco in the Cold Cases 
Unit, Bibb knew about the Palladium case, and he was obviously familiar 
                                                 
130 Apology, supra note 126, at 117. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 129.  After the jury convicted him, Socrates further infuriated the jurors by 
proposing that his punishment should consist of free meals for life in the city hall.  Id.  They 
sentenced him to death.  Socrates concluded that death must not be so bad, because his 
conscience had not spoken to him to tell him he should not have defended himself the way 
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133 See Cohen Interview, supra note 28 (―From my perspective, two-thirds of the 
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with the office‘s many years of stubbornness.  It must have been much 
harder for Bibb to accept that he was being ordered to defend the 
indefensible than a non-prosecutor outsider, faced with the same 
evidence, might find plausible.  What matters is that, in the end, Bibb 
was bigger than the role his office assigned him. 
Cohen remarks, ―No doubt, the experience of representing the 
[D.A.‘s office] was emotional torture for ADA Bibb (as well as 
humiliating), and I am certain that ADA Bibb had a crisis of conscience 
at some point shortly before the hearing.‖134  As mentioned earlier, Bibb 
decided to throw the case in April 2005, a few weeks before the hearing, 
but, as he relates it, his conclusions about the case developed much 
earlier: 
As far as my ―crisis of conscience‖ goes, I came to 
believe that the convictions should be set aside and the 
indictments dismissed (but not necessarily in their 
innocence) by the end of 2003.  Most of the important 
witnesses had been interviewed by then, especially 
Troche and Gray. . . . In July 2003 . . . . I told [Cohen] 
what Troche said and offered my opinion that Spanky‘s 
admissions to Troche placed him in the role Lemus 
played and, therefore, called into question the 
identifications of Lemus. . . .  
. . . . I argued as much in the many meetings with my 
supervisors beginning in 2004.  I really began to 
forcefully argue my beliefs in a meeting with my direct 
supervisor in April 2004.135 
Cohen remarked to me that Bibb‘s demeanor at the hearing showed 
signs of strain that reminded him of Stanley Milgram‘s experimental 
subjects, who visibly struggled with the dilemma of whether to obey 
orders that are obviously harmful to an innocent person.  Bibb agrees 
that he was under considerable strain: 
And as far as stress goes, I can‘t even begin to describe 
it.  I‘d been in courtrooms sitting across from guys who 
were multiple murderers, trying to get a jury to convict 
him [sic] of all those homicides and didn‘t feel any stress 
whatsoever.  This was just different.  When I think back 
on it I sometimes wonder (as does my wife) how I 
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survived the whole mess.  If I had it to do over again I 
think I would just quit the office or refuse to do the 
hearing.  Being out of work would have been a hell of a 
lot less stressful.136 
At one point, Bibb remarked to me, ―I‘ve become a case.  It‘s the 
worst thing in the world—being known for just one thing.  Forget all the 
good I did, all the prosecutions over the years, all the bad guys I put 
behind bars.‖137  I did not quite know what to say, because of course the 
Palladium case was the reason I was talking with him.  But I got his 
point, and it is an important one.  Conscience is not the special property 
of moralists and saints.  It is not the property of humanitarians with 
refined sensibilities—prosecuting felonies is not the career choice of 
delicate people.  If you are lucky, you may never encounter a conscience 
case, although I suspect that prosecutors encounter them more often 
than they recognize.  The test of character is whether, when you do, you 
can be stubborn enough and creative enough to rise to the occasion. 
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